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Abstract 
 
The Primary purpose of this paper is to examine the role and importance of Senior 
Senators in the US Senate. Many states rely on Senators to bring in federal spending in the form 
of pork. When states lose their Senior Senator and the power they accumulated through increased 
tenure, they risk losing certain benefits in terms of pork. We use federal expenditures per dollar 
of tax and analyze how it is affected by Seniority in the Senate. Population, Income, and 
unemployment rates in each state were controlled for in our regression analysis. It is concluded 
that increased tenure significantly increases federal spending to Senators’ states. Though this is 
statistically significant, we find the effects of losing a Senior Senator to be insignificant in the 
overall welfare of a state. 
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Introduction 
 
 United States Senator Daniel Inouye, from Hawaii, was re-elected to his ninth term in 
Congress on November 2, 2010.  He is currently the most senior member in the Senate, and 
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations.  For centuries, he has brought 
billions of dollars into the State of Hawaii through earmark distribution and pork barrel 
spending.  The term “pork” with reference to Congress was popularized Chester Collins Maxey 
in an article in the National Municipal Review in 1919.  “Pork” refers to government spending 
that is set aside for local projects, in order to bring money to a Representative’s District.  In fiscal 
year 2009, members of Congress spent nearly $20 billion on pork-barrel projects.  In fiscal year 
2009, Hawaii received over $19,000 in Federal Government expenditure per capita.  California, 
in that same year, received only $9,360 per capita.  Why is it that a state with a resident 
population of 1,295,178 received more than twice the amount of money than a state with a 
population of 36,961,644?  California’s Senior Senator, Dianne Feinstein, is the 25th most senior 
member in the US Senate.  What role does seniority play in the distribution of federal funds?  
The “Culture of Spending” Hypothesis, presented by James Payne (1991) argues that 
Congressmen are more likely to support federal spending the longer they have been in office.  If 
this is the case, what happens to a state when their Senior Senator retires or dies?  Hawaii, a state 
that is dependent on federal spending to operate, relies on Inouye to bring in pork.  At 86 years 
old, it is not certain that he will live to see the end of his ninth term.  What will happen to the 
Hawaiian economy when it loses its Senior Senator?  Does the length of tenure for the Junior 
Senator have any impact on the allocation of federal funds?  These questions will be answered in 
this paper. 
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 There are many factors that have been argued to increase government spending, other 
than seniority alone.  Party membership and whether a Senator is member of the majority or not, 
can influence the allocation of spending.  Democrats and Republicans may have different 
motives in the Senate.  One may believe that securing earmarks is extremely important, while the 
other may find it detrimental to the role and purpose of government.  These party differences will 
be examined in the analysis.  Population size will also be considered as an influence on 
government spending.  There have been arguments from both sides.  Some say smaller populated 
states have higher number of earmarks (Atlas 1995; Lee 1998) because Senators from smaller 
states are more likely to be reelected if they bring in pork for local projects.  Others argue that 
more populous states have larger number of earmarks (Lazarus et al, 2008).  Population will also 
be examined in the analysis.  
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Literature Review 
 
Public Policy and distributive politics has for a long time been a central issue in the US 
Congress.  Seniority in the US Senate plays a major role in determining how federal funds are 
distributed among states and regions.  Most states rely on pork-barrel projects to thrive.  The 
process in which these funds are allocated has a lot to do with the seniority of State Senators in 
the committee system.  Seniors Senators are given more power, by rule, and are able to influence 
the allocation of federal funds.  For example, the current most Senior Senator is Daniel Inouye 
from Hawaii.  His long tenure in the Senate contributed to his appointment as the Chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee.  In order for a pork-barrel project to be added to the 
Appropriations bill, it must be approved by this Committee.  Inouye has the most power in this 
Committee due to his seniority.  Seniority in the committee system plays a major role in 
determining where pork is allocated.  There has been little research in the past regarding 
seniority in the Senate and distributive politics.  Much of the research deals with unequal Senate 
Apportionment and House seniority.  The small portion of research regarding Congress tenure 
and government spending offers little insight on the differences between Senate and House 
influence.  Also, many studies regarding variables other than Seniority affecting federal outlays 
had been conducted.  The relationship between state growth and Senate Seniority has not yet 
been analyzed.  
Brian E. Roberts, in 1990 at the University of Texas at Austin, analyzed the relationship 
between seniority in the US Senate and the distribution of federal benefits.  For the purpose of 
this study, we will use Roberts’s definition of seniority as, “an ordinal ranking of members of a 
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given congressional committee that is based on committee tenure” (1990, p. 33).  The longer the 
Congressman/woman has served in the Senate, the more seniority s/he will have.  Senators with 
more experience are indirectly given more power by assuming higher positions in the committee 
system.  Roberts examined changes in policy as a result of an “exogenous shock to the seniority 
system”, specifically the unanticipated death of a Senior Senator.  Roberts used the death of 
Senator Henry Jackson to analyze the relationship between committee seniority and constituent 
benefits.  Jackson became Washington’s Senior Senator when Warren Magnuson lost the 
election in 1980.  Right before his death in 1983, Jackson was appointed as the ranking 
Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Roberts explains that Jackson’s death had 
enormous implications for constituent interests in both his State of Washington and the State of 
Georgia, which his successor on the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn represented.  
Roberts also analyzed the consequence of Jackson’s death on the two Senators campaign 
contributors, more evidence that lead to the big question of whether seniority leads to benefits.  
Roberts grouped firms that represented Jackson and Nunn’s various constituent interests 
into two sets: geographic constituents and resource constituents.  By looking at the change in 
stock prices of the firms that represented the Senator’s constituents, Roberts was able to 
determine if there really was a seniority/benefit relationship.  Roberts organized firms into 
groups along sectoral lines. Some of these sectors were more closely related to the committees 
Jackson chaired.  Roberts found that the economic interests in the State of Washington were hit 
severely by Jackson’s death compared to Georgia, at a statistically significant level (1990, p. 47). 
Data was consistent with Robert’s hypothesis that “committee leaders offer tangible benefits to 
their constituent interests”.  With the seniority model, Roberts found that Jackson’s death 
“resulted in substantial redistributions of wealth to the constituents interests of Sam Nunn”. 
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Robert’s research helps point out that there is a huge impact on a state when their Senior Senator 
dies, as the share prices of defense contractors fell in Jackson’s State of Washington, as prices 
were inversely affected in Nunn’s state of Georgia (1990, p. 52).  
Moore and Hibbing (1996) similarly looked at the relationship between Congressional 
Tenure and the allocation of federal funds.  They looked at both House tenure and Senate tenure 
in their analysis.  They also analyzed distributive politics at a state level and at a district level. 
Does tenure lead to direct allocation of funds to a representative’s state?  Does the district that 
the Representative is from benefit most?  Moore and Hibbing found that each additional year of 
tenure for a member of Congress led to a small increase in funds to the district s/he is from. 
However, the data was statistically insignificant (1996, p. 140).  Different results were found for 
the allocation of funds at the state level.  They found that for each year a Congressional member 
gained a year of tenure, the state would receive an extra $71 per person (1996, p. 142).  What 
about the difference between house and senate tenure?  Moore and Hibbing go further to 
examine the difference between the two positions.  Their results indicate a significant coefficient 
for House tenure and a statistically insignificant coefficient for Senate tenure.  However, the data 
Moore and Hibbing collected was from 1983-1990.  This may be too short a time period.  The 
seniority system in the Senate may have changed over the last twenty years, so more recent and 
extensive data could lead to different results.  The returns to Seniority may be different with the 
turn of the century.  This will be examined in the analysis.  
Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt (2008) analyzed the issue concerning pork barrel 
politics in the U.S. Congress.  Specifically, they look at the differences between the House and 
the Senate, and the motivations that lead them to allocate pork in certain ways.  Influences that 
were examined were members’ electoral vulnerability, committee membership, seniority, and 
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party membership.  After testing a number of variables that may have led to increased earmarks, 
Lazarus and Steigerwalt concluded, among other findings, that seniority does plays a major role 
in earmark distribution in both the House and the Senate at a statistically significant level.  Their 
other findings, which are tangents to our interest in seniority, include a significant coefficient for 
Reelection Spillover, indicating there is a positive relationship between dual-requested earmarks 
and a Senator’s partner’s reelection.  Also, contradictory to previous research (Atlas 1995; Lee 
1998) Lazarus et al found a positive and significant relationship between population and 
earmarks.  They found that more populous states receive more earmarks on average (2008, p. 
360) Seniority in the Senate actually had a greater effect on earmark distributions than the 
House.  They found that a one-standard-deviation increase in Seniority in the Senate led to a 
19% increase in earmarks overall.  These findings differ from previous research done by Moore 
and Hibbing (1996). 
Lazarus and Steigerwalt found that majority Democrats in the Senate received almost 
90% more earmarks that Republicans.  Having a longer timeline allows us to examine the 
alterations of the majority party to see which party receives more.  Though it is usually the case 
that the majority party receives more earmark money than the minority, these statistics were 
significantly higher than expected.  Also, it brings up the question of whether one party is 
systematically better than the other at earmarking and the motives that influence their behaviors 
in the Senate.  
Steven Levitt and James Poterba (1999) attempted to find a source of the link between 
state economic growth and congressional representation.  They look at congressional delegation 
seniority, committee membership, and political competition as possible factors leading to state 
economic growth. Similar to Lazarus and Steigerwalt (2008), they found that states represented 
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by very senior Democrats had the highest growth rates.  This brings up the possibility of reverse 
causality and that maybe prosperous states are eager to reelect their incumbent, leading to longer 
tenure.  This is only true for very senior Democrats, as middle ranking Democrats and state 
growth are negatively correlated (1999, p. 192).  There is no statistically significant evidence for 
state growth and any ranking Republican representative.  Levitt and Poterba (1999) used a basic 
regression model to relate state growth rate in per capita personal income and variables for 
congressional delegation seniority, congressional committee influence, and state political 
competition.  The earlier results did not include the second two variables, as they isolated the 
seniority variable.  
Levitt and Poterba (1999) later found that federal spending and economic growth are not 
correlated.  Because spending effects were not large enough to generate the growth effects found, 
Levitt and Poterba came to the conclusion that federal spending did not seem to be the link that 
tied state economic growth and congressional representation.  The relationship between spending 
and seniority was not as strong as the relationship between growth and seniority.  
Cary Atlas et al (1995) examined the unequal per capita representation of Senators in the 
US Congress and how this representation affects allocation of government spending across 
states.  Atlas goes off the assumption that overrepresented states, or states that have a smaller 
population, should receive more per capita federal outlays due to greater per capita resources in 
the Senate and Senators’ incentive to pursuit local benefits.  She believed that Senators will more 
likely choose to benefit local projects than national policy-making when his or her constituency 
is smaller (1995, p. 624-625).  In a state with a smaller population, local benefit-seeking will 
help a congressman or woman to get re-elected more than in a state with a large population.  
Atlas found in her research that states overrepresented in the Senate receive larger per capita 
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federal outlays than large underrepresented States.  She also found that if California’s 
representation in the Senate was proportionate to its population, it would receive an extra $25 
billion in annual federal outlays (1995, p. 627).  
Frances Lee (1998) had similar results when looking at the consequences of Senate 
Apportionment and the allocation of federal outlays.  Lee found using a simple index that there 
are 31 overrepresented states (small populations), 14 underrepresented states (larger 
populations), and five that are represented fairly relative to their population size (1998, p. 38). 
Similar to Atlas et al (1995), Lee argues that Senate apportionment is likely to benefit states with 
smaller populations.  Lee used a pooled cross-sectional time-series design to demonstrate that 
States overrepresented in the Senate tend to receive more per capita federal outlays than more 
populous States.  These overrepresented States receive more than expected on the basis of need 
alone, in 8 out 9 policy areas tested.  The areas affected most by Senate apportionment are 
community development and transportation (1998, p. 58-59). 
Lee (2000) adds to his research and demonstrates consequences in Senate apportionment 
when he analyzed Senate Representation and Coalition building in Distributive Politics.  Lee 
erased the thought that maybe smaller states receive more federal outlays than larger states 
because they are in greater need, when he proves that a states need for federal funding 
corresponds closely to its population size.  A state like California needs much more federal 
outlays than a state like Wyoming. However, when it comes to the distribution of funds, small-
State Senators will have a much bigger influence than large-state Senators.  The allocation of 
funds largely reflects small-state Senators’ preferences.  Lee goes on to discuss coalition building 
and how large-state senators must seek out members to build a coalition in order to direct funds 
their way.  
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Lee (2004) again builds on his research when he examines Bicameralism and Geographic 
Politics.  He shifts his area of focus to differentiate between House and Senate’s impact on 
distributive politics.  Lee finds that the Senate has a much bigger impact on the distribution of 
funds than the House.  This is in large part due to Senate apportionment.  Senators and House 
members have different incentives in allocating funds, and Lee finds that the Senate’s 
preferences have a much larger impact in distributive politics than House preferences (2004, p. 
205).  
Herron and Shotts (2006) examine term limits and how they may affect pork spending by 
the US Government. Currently in the US Senate, there are no term limits.  However, Herron and 
Shotts (2006) use a legislative model to show that term limits in Congress would decrease the 
amount of pork allocated, as voters would not be able to re-elect representatives who were able 
to bring home pork in the past.  This assumes and is proven in past literature that voters want 
Representatives who bring in federal outlays to their state. Herron and Shotts also prove that 
Senior Representatives are more likely to vote for pork-barrel projects than Junior 
Representatives (2006, p. 396).  The results proving term limits would decrease pork-barreling, 
implies that the absence of term limits, or increased tenure leads to increased pork allocation.  
Their theoretical model, built for a generic representative body, is not tailored to either US 
House or Senate. 
Almost no research has been done regarding the relationship between Hawaii State 
growth, federal spending, and Senate Representation.   A 2001 report from the Department of 
Business, Economic, Development, and Tourism, illustrates Hawaii’s dependence on Federal 
Government expenditures.  From 1990-2000, Federal Expenditures to Hawaii increased by more 
than 60 percent. In those same years, these expenditures accounted for up to 12 percent of Gross 
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State Product (2001, p. 2).  How these federal expenditures were affected by congressional 
representation and pork-barreling projects remain untested? 
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Data 
 
The data chosen for the present study was used to analyze the effects of Senate Seniority 
on the distribution of federal funds to individual states.  Data was collected from 1981 to 2005 on 
all fifty US States (does not include District of Columbia).  Every state Senator, along with their 
tenure, from 1981-2005 was collected from the US Senate web-based system.  Senators serving 
for the first time in 1981 were given a numerical value of “0” for tenure.  Each year of added 
service increased their numerical value for tenure by “1”.  Senators that had served in the Senate 
before 1981 were given a numerical value for tenure in 1981 equal to the amount of years 
already served (e.g. if a senator was elected in 1979, his/her value for 1981 would be “2”).  The 
political party of each Senator was also recorded.  Senators were given a value “1” if they 
belonged to the Republican Party or “2” for the Democrat Party. 
The dependent variable “Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax” was used to measure 
federal spending per state.  Each state sends taxes and receives federal spending from the 
government.  The amounts for tax and spending are different for each state.  The values in 
“Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax” were calculated by the amount of funds states receive 
per dollar of tax they pay. The average Expenditure Per dollar Tax from 1981-2005 was $1.12 
across all 50 states.  This data was taken from the Tax Foundation’s web-based system.  
The populations for all 50 States from 1981-2005 were taken from the US Census 
Bureau.  The natural log of population was then calculated for each state and year and tested as a 
possible variable that affects spending.  The ln (population) was used instead of total population 
in order to control for malapportionment, or unequal representation.  For example, a population 
increase of one million people for a state like Hawaii (pop = 1,275,194 in 2005) is much more 
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substantial than a similar increase for a state like California (pop = 36,132,147 in 2005).  The 
natural log of population controls for malapportionment in state size when testing the 
independent variables against federal spending.  
Federal unemployment benefits contribute to overall spending by the government, the 
dependent variable in this study.  These benefits differ for each state and depend on 
unemployment rates.  Therefore, unemployment rates were obtained from the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  Without accounting for the unemployment rate, federal unemployment benefits 
may be accredited to Senators who come from states with high unemployment rates. Controlling 
for these rates avoids the possibility of this problem.  The average unemployment rate across all 
states from 1981-2005 was 5.9%.  
Per Capita State Income was also recorded for each state and year.  Federal income taxes, 
which are progressive, differ for each state.  States that make more on average pay more in taxes 
to the government.  This affects the dependent variable, “Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax”, 
in our study.  Thus, it is important to control for average income level of each state.   Data was 
collected from the US Census Bureau.  Average per capita income for all states from 1981-2005 
was $21,119.  
The political party of the Senior Senator, denoted “Party Senior”, and the political party 
of the Junior Senator, denoted “Party Junior”, were derived for each state and year.  Once again, 
Senators were given a value “1” if they belonged to the Republican Party or “2” for the 
Democrat Party.  This variable was used to test whether the political party of the Senior Senator 
or Junior Senator was important in amount of federal funds distributed.  
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The Political Parties controlling the House, Senate, and White House in each year during 
the period of 1981-2005 were recorded.  For each variable, another dummy variable was created 
and given a value of “1” for each year and state if the political party of the Senior Senator at the 
time, matched the political party of the chamber being examined.  For example, in 1990 for the 
State of Alabama, the Senior Senator was Howell Heflin.  The variable “control_S” was given a 
value of “1” because both Howell Heflin and the majority party in the Senate were Democratic. 
Another variable “WH/H/S_tenure_s” was created for all three chambers that had a numerical 
value equal to the tenure of the Senior Senator if “control_WH/H/S” had a value of “1”.  
Variable Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Tenure Senior 1250 15.36 9.19 0 46 
Tenure Junior 1250 6.25 5.86 0 36 
Pop (State) 1250 5207 5671.8 418 36132 
Ln (pop) 1250 8.07 1.01 6.035 10.495 
Income 1250 21.2 7452 7849 48032 
Unemployment 1250 5.85 2.05 2.3 17.4 
Expenditure per 
dollar Tax 
1250 1.12 0.289 0.57 2.33 
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Data Analysis 
 
In order to see the affects of controlling for specific variables, a simple regression was 
initially ran between tenure of the Senior Senator (Tenure Senior) and Junior Senator (Tenure 
Junior) on the federal expenditures per dollar of tax (Expenditure per dollar of Tax).  The 
regression was the most basic of regressions as it did not control for any of the factors that were 
considered to invalidate the results.  
 The party of the Senior (Party Senior) and party of the Junior (Party Junior) were added 
to the tenure of the senior and junior for the next regression.  The regression was ran to see 
examine the change in the Expenditure per dollar of Tax if the party of the senior or junior senior 
changed from a value of “1” (Republican) to “2” (Democrat).  However, this regression did not 
control for population size and malapportionment.  The effects of political party on Expenditure 
per dollar of Tax may be the result of the unequal representation of people’s political affiliation 
across the United States. In order to control for this problem, the natural log of population 
(ln_pop) was added to the next regression.   This leads to a more accurate outcome for the effects 
of political affiliation on federal expenditure per dollar of tax.  
 Unemployment rates and state income per capita were the next two variables added to the 
regression.  Unemployment benefits contribute to federal spending receipts, along with income 
tax that varies across different US States.  Controlling for these two variables leads to more 
accurate results.  Richer states that pay more in taxes have a smaller Expenditure per dollar of 
Tax on average, which would be expected given income taxes directly affect Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax.   Also states that have high unemployment rates receive more in unemployment 
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benefits.  These skewed statistics will not cause errors in the regression analysis, as they are 
controlled for.  
Lastly, in three separate regressions, “control_WH/S/H” and “WH/S/H_tenure_s” were 
added and examined.  These variables were added to see how Expenditure per dollar of Tax 
changed if a senior senator’s, whose political party was the same as the chamber being analyzed 
for the specified state and year, tenure increased by one year.  All three chambers: Senate, 
House, and White House were examined and regressed.  These results tell us which chamber and 
senator political affiliation combination leads to higher federal spending per dollar tax.  
Fixed state effects were also controlled for in each regression.  The fact that Hawaii 
receives more in defense spending than other states on average due to their location, should not 
affect differences in overall returns to states.  Fixed effects were controlled, and therefore one 
more possible obstruction in obtaining accurate results was removed.  
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Results 
 
After running a simple regression between the tenures and political affiliations of the 
senior and junior senators on the amount of federal spending per dollar of state taxes, I found 
three of the four variables, Tenure Senior, Party Senior, and Party Junior, to be statistically 
significant at the 99th percentile.  Without controlling for any of the other variables, I found that 
increasing the tenure of the Senior Senator by one year, increased Expenditure per dollar of Tax 
by $0.003.  Increasing the value of Party Senior from “1” to “2”, meaning a change from the 
Republican Party to the Democratic Party, causes Expenditure per dollar of Tax decrease of 
nearly $.06.  As for Party Junior, the same change leads to a $0.03 decrease in Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax.  This is interesting as the results imply that Republicans are better at pulling in 
pork than Democrats.  However, this regression did not control for malapportionment or any 
other factors that may lead to inaccurate results. 
Running a regression controlling for all of our variables, we find different results.  The 
second Regression in Table 1 shows us that Tenure Junior, along with the other three variables 
examined in the initial regression, are all statistically significant at least at the 90th percentile. 
Tenure Junior is particularly interesting, as it is negative and significant.  This implies that 
increasing the tenure of the junior senator actually decreases the amount of Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax.  In this case, it is more beneficial for a state to have a Senior Senator with ten 
years tenure and a Junior Senator with two years tenure, than a Senior Senator with ten years 
tenure and a Junior Senator with nine year of tenure.  It is hard to explain why a larger gap in 
regards to tenure between a Senior and Junior Senator leads to higher federal spending among 
individual states.   It is easy to understand why increased tenure of the Senior Senator leads to 
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higher spending, as more Seniority means more power in the Senate, but the negative 
relationship between tenure of the Junior Senator and Expenditure per dollar of Tax is a bit more 
confusing.  It is possible that higher combined power, in terms of tenure, for two State Senators 
is bad when forming coalitions while trying to advocate for pork-projects.  Two very 
experienced Senators may mean too much power in coalition building in the eyes of other 
senators.  Having a very Senior Senator and an inexperienced Junior Senator may not seem as 
threatening in terms of power.  Therefore, this combination of state Senators may be better at 
coalition building and bringing in pork to home-states.  
Another interesting finding in the regression was the Unemployment statistic, which was 
negative and significant at the 95th percentile.  Increasing unemployment rates by 1% causes a 
$0.006 drop in Expenditure per dollar of Tax. This is interesting because higher unemployment 
rates lead to higher unemployment benefits from the government for a given state.  Thus, if rates 
go up, Expenditure per dollar of Tax should also go up, controlling for income and population 
size.  However, the results lead us to believe that a lower unemployment rate equals higher 
Expenditure per dollar of Tax for a given state.  It is possible that Senators from states with low 
unemployment rates are more driven to bring in pork in order to maintain their states high status.  
Senators from states with higher unemployment rates may not have the drive to bring money to 
their home state and believe that spending should go to a state that deserves it, in terms of hard 
work.  Though this explanation seems highly fabricated, it represents some sort of justification 
for the peculiar results.  
Income per capita, similar to the results for Unemployment, was also interesting. Income 
per capita was positive and statistically significant at the 99th percentile.  Increasing income by 
$1000 causes a $0.006 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax.  Income is usually tied to taxes. 
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States with higher incomes have higher taxes and therefore should have a lower Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax.  This, however, is not consistent with our findings.  The results lead me to another 
possible, but unlikely explanation.  Higher income and therefore, higher tax rates may give 
Senators more incentive to bring back money that was taken from the people (in taxes) in his/her 
home state.  Pork, in this case, would be positively correlated with income per capita. 
More normal findings exist for other variables, in their relationship to Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax, such as population size.  From the regression, I found ln(population) to be 
negative and statistically significant at the 99th percentile.  Increasing ln(population) one unit 
causes a $0.39 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax.  The large increase in Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax may seem extreme, but a one unit increases in ln(population) is very large as  well.  
For example, the average ln(population)  from 1981-2005 in Hawaii was 7.04, while the average 
for California was only 10.33.  States with higher populations on average will usually also 
receive less in federal expenditures.  This can be explained by the assumption that Senators from 
states with lower populations are likely to bring in more pork for local projects, with the 
incentive of being re-elected.  Senators from larger states, due to the sheer number of people, are 
not usually associated with the retrieval of pork.  Therefore, acquiring pork may not be as 
important for these Senators.  
 Comparing chamber political affiliations, we find only Control House and H_tenure_s to 
be statistically significant (p<0.05).  Control House was negative, which means that if the 
political party of the Senior Senator goes from being different (denoted “0”) than the affiliation 
of the House Majority, to the same (denoted “1”), then there will be a $0.03 decrease in 
Expenditure per dollar of Tax.  Therefore, it is better for a state if their Senior Senator’s political 
affiliation is different than that of the majority if the house. H_tenure_s, on the other hand, was 
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positive in its relationship to Expenditure per dollar of Tax.  This statistic tells us that if a Senior 
Senator’s political affiliation is the same as the House Majority’s political affiliation, then an 
increase of one year of tenure causes a $0.002 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax.  This 
finding seems to contradict our findings for Control House.  However, a positive H_tenure_s is 
only explaining an increase of tenure if political parties are similar, while Control House only 
tells us that it is better to have a Senator with a different political affiliation than that of the 
House majority.  
 Another possible explanation for the unanticipated results for Unemployment, Income per 
cap, and Party Junior is that there is an endogeneity problem.  The econometrics were wrong 
because of reverse causality.  We know, for example that, that there is a positive relationship 
between Income per cap and Expenditure per dollar of tax.  However, reversing the cause and 
effect variables lead to overestimation of our results.  The direction of the bias is hard to solve 
unless we use a bivariate model.  In a multivariate regression, it is hard to know the direction of 
the bias.  Increases in Expenditure per dollar Tax are attributed to the accompanying increase in 
Income per cap, even though other variables may have affected the results.  
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The Effects of given variables on Expenditure per dollar of Tax 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax **** 
Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax **** 
Expenditure per 
dollar of Tax **** 
    
Tenure Senior 0.00287*** 0.00154** 0.00178** 
 (0.000553) (0.000697) (0.000691) 
Tenure Junior -0.000966 -0.00142* -0.00153** 
 (0.000778) (0.000751) (0.000749) 
Party Senior -0.0581*** -0.0511*** -0.0425*** 
 (0.00995) (0.00983) (0.0103) 
Party Junior -0.0269*** -0.0279*** -0.0275*** 
 (0.00868) (0.00845) (0.00841) 
Ln(population)  -0.388*** -0.368*** 
  (0.0461) (0.0451) 
Unemployment  -0.00576** -0.00531** 
  (0.00226) (0.00224) 
Income per cap  0.00572*** 0.00537*** 
  (0.000774) (0.000760) 
Control Senate  -0.000508 -0.00714 
  (0.0127) (0.0121) 
S_tenure_s  -1.81E-05 0.000717 
  (0.000734) (0.000673) 
Control House  -0.0323**  
  (0.0143)  
H_tenure_s  0.00169**  
  (0.000822)  
Control White House   0.00852 
   (0.0129) 
WH_tenure_s   0.000919 
   (0.000710) 
Constant 1.207*** 4.274*** 4.079*** 
 (0.0214) (0.362) (0.355) 
    
Observations 1250 1250 1250 
R-squared 0.053 0.132 0.138 
Number of stateID 50 50 50 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
**** Federal Expenditure per dollar of State Tax 
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Discussion 
 
Ted Stevens, the longest serving Republican Senator in US History from Alaska, lost his 
seventh re-election bid in 2008.  The loss left Alaska with Republican Lisa Murkowski to replace 
Stevens as their Senior Senator.   In the 2009 Alaska primary elections, Murkowski illustrated 
the importance of Seniority to voters.  Unfortunately for Murkowski, the state that had received 
billions in federal dollars largely in part to Stevens, did not agree, and voted fellow Republican 
Joe Miller to take her place.  Steve Haycox, a University of Alaska Anchorage history professor, 
said in article, “On the face of it, it puts Alaska in a desperate economic situation because it will 
have two junior senators…That's a big, big problem when one-third of our economic base is 
federal spending." This is the exact situation that people in Hawaii are anxiously awaiting when 
Senator Daniel Inouye eventually loses his seat in the Senate. Nearly fifty years of experience in 
the Senate simply cannot be replaced.  How much will states like Hawaii and Alaska suffer with 
the loss of their Senior Senator?   Will it really be a “big, big problem” as Haycox puts it?  
It has been concluded in the study that, in terms of federal spending per dollar of tax, 
states will be negatively affected by the loss of a Senior Senator.  Controlling for the variables 
we analyzed, Hawaii will approximately lose ($0.0015 x [48-20]) $0.04 in Expenditure per 
dollar Tax if Daniel Inouye (48 years) is replaced by the current Junior Hawaii Senator Daniel 
Akaka (20 years).  However, they should also gain ($0.0014 x [20-0]) nearly $0.03 with the 
decreased tenure of the Junior Senator. Alaska’s change will be even less than Hawaii as 
Murkowski only had eight years of tenure under her belt.  
The loss of Senate Seniority will not completely sink Hawaii and Alaska’s economy, but 
it will definitely have a big impact.  Federal spending is obviously a huge reason why states like 
   
 
23
Hawaii and Alaska are able to thrive.  In Alaska from 1982 to 2005, Expenditure per dollar Tax 
increased 216% from $0.85 to $1.84 and expenditures per capita jumped %280 from $4977 to 
$13950.  This is in large part due to Stevens and his chairmanship to the Appropriations 
Committee in 1998.  Steven’s seniority was extremely important for Alaska in terms of his 
chairmanship.  A similar situation occurred in 1997 when Oregon lost 30 years of Senate 
experience and two periods of Appropriation chairmanship with the retirement of Mark Hatfield. 
States that lose senior representatives like Hatfield and Stevens are losing years of institutional 
knowledge.  Senior Senators understand the system; they know who to call, they know how to 
get things done quickly, and they know exactly what they need. It is like any industry.  When a 
company loses a worker with decades of experience, they are losing all the invaluable knowledge 
that worker has accumulated over his/her career.  This knowledge is very hard to replace and 
often times companies or states struggle to move on.  
A large part of pork allocation in the Senate deals with forming coalitions.  Fortunately 
for states like Alaska, the relationships Senators create often last after a Senator has lost his/her 
position.  For example, Stevens and current Appropriations chairman Daniel Inouye had a great 
relationship in the Senate.  Inouye often visited Alaska, and understood the challenges they 
faced.  It is unlikely that Inouye will leave Alaska in the cold, even when Stevens is gone.   
Making positive relationships is another key immeasurable quality that Senior Senators possess.  
Another reason why state economies will not completely destruct when losing a Senior 
Senator is the fact that there is a federal commitment to each and every state.  Alaska receives 
large amounts of federal spending in environment projects, an area that will be boosted under a 
Democratic administration.  A state like Hawaii is extremely important as strategic military 
center for the US. Daniel Inouye without a doubt plays a key role in the allocating federal 
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spending for the military complex in Hawaii, but losing him does not mean the state will lose 
money for defense.  Hawaii will remain a military center and will continue to receive money for 
military purposes, no matter who is the Senior Senator.  
Many of the plans that Daniel Inouye has enacted and is currently working on will 
continue to benefit the state for many years.  This type of “long-tem thinking” is crucial for 
Hawaii’s future.  Future Hawaii Senators will be able to continue Inouye’s Legacy by carrying 
out his plans. I n essence, Inouye will be a contributing factor to Hawaii’s economy long after he 
leaves.  
While state Senators can play a large role, there are many other factors that go into a 
state’s economy.  It is almost impossible to forecast the future of that state in terms of Senate 
Seniority.  Senior Senators, and their committee chairmanship, have a lot to do with the welfare 
of their state, and it is hard to replace a Senator with decades of experience.  Fortunately, the 
effects Senators have on states do not disappear when they retire or lose their seat. States 
continue to operate on plans enacted by previous Senators, and are able to thrive with 
government support.  
As for the future of Hawaii, it will continue to play a monumental role for national 
prosperity, with or without Daniel Inouye.  As long as future Senators continues to support 
positive plans for the people of Hawaii, it will continue to be a paradise for all.  
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